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ABSTRACT
Based on recent theoretical developments I argue that the
average level of human capital is a local public good. Cities
with higher average levels of human capital should therefore have
higher wages and higher land rents. After conditioning on the
characteristics of individual workers and dwellings, this
prediction is supported by data for Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Areas (SMSAs) in the United States, where the SMSA
average levels of formal education and work experience are used
as proxies for the average level of human capital. I evaluate
the alternative explanations of omitted SMSA variables and
self-selection. I conclude by computing an estimate of the
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1. Introduction
It is commonly believed that individuals do not capture all of the benefits from their
ownership of human capital. This belief is often cited to justify government subsidies to
formal education. As Schultz (1988) states in his survey of the role of education in
economic development, "education is widely viewed as a public good (with positive
externalities), which increases the efficiency of economic and political institutions while
hastening the pace of scientific advance". Recently human capital externalities have come
to bear considerable explanatory weight in formal theoretical modelling. Lucas (1988)
allows the average national level of human capital per worker to act as an externality that
flicks-neutrally shifts the aggregate production function. Azariadis and Dra.zen (1990)
follow Lucas in assuming that the average level of human capital is a "social input" to
aggregate production in their model.
The microeconomic foundation of this external effect of human capital is the sharing
of knowledge and skills between workers that occurs through both formal and informal
interaction. The "diffusion and growth of knowledge" that takes place as a result of that
interaction is modelled in a paper by Jovanovic and Rob (1989). In their model individuals
augment their knowledge through pairwise meetings at which they exchange ideas. In each
time period each individual seeking to augment his knowledge meets an agent chosen
randomly from a distribution of agents/ideas. Though a proof requires additional
assumptions, intuitively it seems clear that the higher the average level of human capital
(knowledge) of the agents, the more "luck" the agents will have with their meetings and
the more rapid will be the diffusion and growth of knowledge. If this knowledge concerns
technological improvements, we have a microeconomic foundation not only for external
effects of human capital on total factor productivity, but also for making those external
effects dependent on the average level of human capital.
Given the existence of human capital externalities, economically identical workers2
will tend to earn higher wages in human capital rich than in human capital poor countries.
This result is consistent with the large realized net migration from the latter to the former
countries and unsatisfied demand for further immigration. The problem with inferring that
human capital externalities causethesewage differentials is that a high average level of
human capital is associated with a high level of economic development.1 A high level of
economic development is in turn associated with other factors that tend to cause high
wages such as a large and technologically current stock of physical capital per capita. For
this reason it would obviously be very difficult to econometrically identify the effects of
human capital externalities with any confidence using cross-country data, even if we were
to overcome the problems of cross-country data comparability. By looking at different
regions within one country, however, we can identify these effects, since if the country has
a well-developed electronic communications system the cost of capital and the level of
"disembodied" technological knowledge will presumably be the same within its borders.
Indeed, Lucas argues that metropolitan areas are the most appropriate units to examine
when looking for the productivity-enhancing effects of human capital abundance. He cites
the work of Jane Jacobs, The Economy of Cities (1969), which provides numerous concrete
examples of "creative" economic life in cities where external economies generated by
interaction among educated and/or experienced individuals are important. It certainly
seems reasonable to think that random meetings, as opposed to costly, prearranged ones,
would take place within a limited spatial area rather than uniformly distributed over an
entire country.2
'Balassa (1979) computes a rank correlation coefficient of .754 between per capita GNP and
the Harbison-Myers index of human resource development for 36 countries evenly divided
between developed and less developed.
2One concrete example of how these externalities work was provided to me by a Silicon
Valley engineer. He explained that firms locating in the San Jose metropolitan area were
able to benefit from what he called "cross-pollenization of ideas" because of the constant
movement of both engineers and lower-level technical workers between the firms located
there. By dramatically reducing transportation costs, geographic concentration facilitates
this movement, which is analogous to the random "meetings" modelled by Jovanovic and
Rob.3
By generating higher wages for a given set of individual characteristics, productivity
benefits from geographic concentration of human capital set up strong pressures for
migration. Since within a country people are free to migrate (there are usually no
immigration or emigration barriers), why are wages not driven to equality for all
economically identical agents? The answer given by the simple local public goods model
below is that migration to high wage areas leads to higher residential and commercial rents
there, which offset the higher wages and allow for a spatial equilibrium where utility levels
and production costs are equalized across metropolitan areas. Cities with higher average
levels of human capital should therefore have higher wages and higher land rents. After
conditioning on the characteristics of individual workers and dwellings, I will test this
prediction below using data for Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) in the
United States, where the SMSA average levels of formal education and work experience are
used as proxies for the average level of human capital. If the data support this prediction,
my model will also allow me to estimate the magnitude of the productivity benefits realized
from geographic concentration of human capital.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. A formal model that treats the
average level of human capital as a local public good is presented in section 2. In section 3
I estimate the model of section 2 in reduced form. Section 4 deals with the possibility of
omitted variable bias in the results of section 3 by controlling for additional SMSA local
public goods likely to be correlated with the SMSA average level of human capital, and also
evaluates the argument that the results of section 3 are due to selection bias. In the
concluding section I compute an estimate of the effect of an additional year of average
education on total factor productivity and compare my estimate to one that can be
obtained from the growth model calibration exercise of Lucas (1988).
2. The formal model
The model of this section is a straightforward adaptation of the local public goods4
model of Roback (1982). To minimize repetition I will therefore be very brief in my
description.
Assume that households and firms are freely mobile between a fixed number of
SMSAs in the sense that their cost of changing locations is zero, though once they choose to
locate in a particular SMSA they cannot work (employ workers) in another SMSA. For
simplicity intracity commuting is not considered. Each SMSA offers a fixed amount of
land and a given bundle of site characteristics 8,wherethe subscript jindexesthe
SMSAs. Households gain utility through use of a composite commodity, local residential
land, and local site characteristics. Site characteristics are local public goods (climate is a
good example), while use of the composite commodity and land are purchased out of labor
earnings, which comprise all of income. (Here I have adopted the assumption of Henderson
(1985, chapter 2) that rentiers (owners of land and capital) do not live in SMSAs.) The
differences in the level of human capital across households are measured by the amount of
efficiency units of labor h with which they are endowed.3 Households supply their
efficiency units inelastically in exchange for the wage per efficiency unit w. As in
Heckscher-Ohlin trade models, preferences are assumed to be identical and homothetic
across households. The assumption of homotheticity insures that spatial equilibrium can




where V is the indirect utility enjoyed by the owner of one efficiency unit of labor, r is the
rent on one unit of land, and u0 is the common nationwide utility level for owners of one
efficiency unit. Firms combine capital, local labor and local land to produce the composite
commodity. The return to capital is fixed by an international capital market. Prices,
wages, and rents are normalized on the price of the composite good, so that the price of the
3This is the Lucas (1988) formulation: in his model (p. 17) a worker with human capital h
is the productive equivalent of two workers with h/2 each.5
compo8itegood is set to unity. Production technology is constant returns to scale in labor,
land,andcapital, with site characteristics entering production as Hicks-neutral shift
parameters. Spatial equilibrium then requires
c(rw;s) =1, (2)
where c is the unit cost function. The cost of capital has been suppressed since it is equal
across all SMSAs.






Fig. 1: Determination of the wage and rental rates in city j
Theupward-sloping or consumer equilibrium curve represents the w-r combinations
satisfying v(r;s)w =u0for a given bundle of site characteristicss, while the
downward-sloping or firm equilibrium curve represents w-r combinations satisfying
c(r,w;s) =1for a given s. Withr and w
determined by equations (1) and (2), I can find
derived demands for land and labor by firms and for land by households. Given the local
average level of human capitalI can then use the land and labor market clearing
conditions to determine the equilibrium values of SMSA production of the composite good
(X3) and SMSA population (N) noting that gives the measure of all efficiency units




It is important to note that, because there is no spatial sorting of consumers by efficiency
unit endowment,itself is left undetermined by my model. In particular, it is not
inlluenced by w or r. In the empirical work of sections 3 and 4 below it is simplest to
think of h as historically predetermined.
Consider a site characteristic that increases productivity but has no amenity value.
A higher value of that characteristic will shift out the firm equilibrium curve uniformly
while leaving the consumer equilibrium curve in place. According to the discussion in the
introduction,4 the local average level of human capital can be thought of as just such a site
characteristic.5 As can be seen using Figure 1, the result is that an SMSA with a higher h
will have a higher wage per efficiency unit of labor and a higher rent per unit of land,
holding other site characteristics constant. This result is robust to a common
generalization of the model given by equations (1) and (2) (see, for example, Roback (1982)
and Beeson and Eberts (1989)), which is to allow for local production of housing services
that households consume rather than consuming land services directly. Insofar as a higher
htendsto enhance the productivity of housing service production, the effect of a higher
on the wage rate is dampened because the impact on households of the higher rent on land
is dampened, causing them to require a smaller wage differential to be compensated for the
higher land rental. It can be shown that even if the effect of on housing service
productivity is as great (as measured by the absolute value of the cost function elasticity)
A constant productivity differential due to differences in histhe result generated by
models such as those of Lucas (1988) and Azariadis and Drazen (1990). However, the
microfoundations of these models suggest that a higher hleadsto more rapid diffusion and
growth of knowledge, implying an increasing productivity differential. One could reconcile
the two specifications by supposing that after a certain fixed interval of time knowledge
created within an SMSA becomes disembodied (reproduced on blueprints or taught in
business schools) and thus available to the nation (or world) at large. In this case overall
productivity will increase at the same rate across all SMSAs but a fixed productivity
differential will exist between SMSAs with different average levels of human capital.
The possibility that some amenity value may be associated with will be considered in the
empirical discussion of section 4.1.7
as its effect on composite commodity productivity, the wage differential will still be
positive provided that the share of rent in the cost of housing services is greater than in the
cost of composite commodity production.
3.Evidence
The system consisting of equations (1) and (2) that is depicted in Figure 1 can be
estimated in reduced form using hedonic wage and rent equations. In other words, I can
estimate the wage of an individual as a function of both his individual characteristics, such
as health and marital status, and the characteristics of the SMSA in which he lives, such as
the average level of human capital. By controlling for the wage earner's individual
characteristics I obtain in effect an equation for w in the above model. A similar equation
can be estimated for housing expenditure, which serves as a good proxy for r when I
control for the characteristics of the dwelling. Like the site characteristics used in the
empirical local public goods literature, the average level of human capital in an SMSA is
exogenous from the point of view of an individual consumer or firm making its location
decision. Since iij is not influenced by w or rj I treat it in the same way that exogenous
variables like climate are treated in the empirical local public goods literature (see
Blomquist, Berger, and Hoehn (1988) for a recent example) and enter it directly into the
reduced form regressions. On the basis of the discussion in section 2 we expect this
variable to have a positive coefficient in both the wage and the rent equations. If these
coefficients are significant their size will allow me to determine the importance of the
productivity benefits realized from geographic concentration of human capital in a manner
to be made precise below.
I need an empirical translation of the theoretical concept of homogeneous human
capital. In the empirical labor economics literature, the human capital that an individual
accumulates over her lifetime is typically decomposed into two measurable components:
education and experience, measured by years of schooling completed and age minus years of8
schooling minus six, respectively. Suppose now that I measure the average level of human
capital in an SMSA by average education and average experience. Since this
decomposition could presumably be influenced by government educational policy, it would
be interesting to know if these two variables differ in their external effects (if any) on total
factor productivity. I will therefore investigate this issue below.
The wage and rent equations are estimated using the 1 in 1000 B Public Use
Microdata Sample of the 1980 Census of Population. The B Sample is collected on an
SMSA basis (as opposed to the A Sample which is collected on a county basis) and is
therefore ideal for our purposes. It contains information on all of the usual individual
attributes of workers and dwellings known to influence wages and housing expenditure,
respectively. I have included in my housing sample all housing units on 10 or fewer acres
for which value of the unit or contract rent is reported. In the wage sample are included all
individuals aged 16 and over who reported their earnings, hours and weeks, had nonzero
wage and salary earnings, and had positive total earnings.6 The SMSA averages for years
of schooling and years of experience are computed from the wage sample. The logarithm of
monthly housing expenditures is the dependent variable in the housing equation. For
renters, monthly housing expenditures is defined as gross rent including utilities. For
owners, reported house value is converted to monthly imputed rent using a 7.85 percent
discount rate taken from a user cost study by Peiser and Smith (1985). Monthly
expenditures for utilities are added to obtain gross imputed rent for owners. The
dependent variable in the wage equation is the logarithm of average hourly earnings.
Average hourly earnings are obtained by dividing annual earnings by the product of weeks
61n order to insure more accurate reporting of home values, Beeson and Eberts (1989) limit
their sample to individuals who changed addresses between 1975 and 1980. However, for
most individuals their largest asset is their home (Pearl and Frankel, 1984), so we might
expect home owners to be fairly accurate when asked to estimate the value of their units.
Cross-sectional studies have in fact found this to be true on average (Kain and Quigley,
1972; Robins and West, 1977).9
worked during the year and usual hours worked per week.'
The wage and rent hedonic equations were estimated using observations on 69,910
individuals and 44,758 households, respectively, residing in 237 SMSAs. I use the same set
of variables used by Blomquist, Berger, and Hoehn (1988) to control for the characteristics
of individual workers and dwellings. The Census control variables listed in Tables 1 and 2
are self-explanatory. The omitted broad occupational category in the wage equation is
service. The only non-Census control variable is the percent of the individual's industry
that is unionized, which is taken from a study by Kokkelenberg and Sockell (1985).
The standard procedure in the empirical local public goods literature (see, e.g., the
work of Roback (1982) and Blomqwst, Berger, and Hoehn (1988) cited above) is to
estimate the wage and rent hedonic regressions using ordinary least squares (OLS). Their
underlying statistical model is therefore
Y1j=a+Xj/3+ZJlr+(jJ (5)
where i indexes the individual workers or dwellings, jcontinuesto index cities, y is the
dependent variable (in our case either the log wage or the log rent), x is a vector of
observed individual characteristics, z is a vector of observed city characteristics, and is an
error term that captures the effects of unobserved individual characteristics and satisfies all
the properties of the classical regression model. The OLS model implicitly assumes that all
relevant city characteristics are observed. if, as seems reasonable to believe, this is not the
case, then a more appropriate model is the random effects model
=a+ x8 + zçy + + , (6)
where p is an error term that captures the effects of unobserved city characteristics and
also satisfies all the properties of the classical regression model. Equation (6) can be
7luclusion of nontraded services other than housing in the model of section 2 might suggest
adjusting wages for differences across SMSAs in non-housing cost of living. However,
separate cost of living indices are reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for only 28
metropolitan areas covering 33 SMSAs. Beeson and Eberts (1989, p. 451) report that these
non-housing cost of living indices vary by only plus or minus four percent of the national
average.10
viewed as the outcome of a model where city effects on wages and rents are explained by
observed and unobserved city characteristics:
=xfl+ +
(7)
where 5 is the city effect on log wages (log rents).
Since the error term =+in equation (6) is nonspherical,8 estimation of
this model by OLS yields inefficient coefficient estimates and biased and inconsistent
estimates of their standard errors.9 This problem does not appear to have been
investigated in the empirical literature on local public goods cited above. In this paper I
will estimate equation (6) using generalized least squares (GLS). The estimation procedure
that follows naturally from the underlying model (7) requires several steps:
1. Estimate the least squares dummy variable equation y13 -= (x1 - )fl +-
Thecoefficient estimates b serve as useful points of reference and are also employed in the
next step. The residuals from the estimated equation are used to compute a consistent
estimate ofthe variance of
2. Form = -
x1b.ä is then an estimate of + .Substituteforfrom (7), and
estimate the equation =a+ z'i + +The estimates of 'y are less efficient than the
GLS estimates but should be similar. The residuals from the estimated equation are used
to compute a consistent estimate of =+((1/m)(u/n)J, where m (=237)is the
I
number of cities and n is the number of individual observations per city.
3. Use the estimates ofandfrom steps 1 and 2 to compute a consistent estimate of
8Speciflcally, the variance-covariance matrix for observations within any city jgeneratedby
the error termhas off-diagonal terms equal tothe variance ofp,
rather than zero.
9My experience with OLS estimates of this model is in accord with the findings of Moulton
(1986), who reviewed several studies where equations were estimated using both individual
and group level data: the null hypothesis of spherical errors is rejected and the OLS
standard errors on the coefficients for the group level variables tend to be much smaller
than those estimated using the random effects model, leading to much higher t ratios for
these coefficients in the OLS case.11
and make the appropriate GLS transformation of the data (see, e.g., Greene (1990, p.
487)).
In column (1) of Tables 1 and 2, respectively, I report the least squares dummy
variable estimates of the hedonic wage and rent equations from step 1. Except for
anomalous negative coefficients giving the effects of condominium status and city sewer
connection on log rents, the signs and magnitudes of the coefficients on the characteristics
of individual workers and dweilings are as expected and are in line with those obtained by
other studies. Column (2) gives the GLS estimates of these equations including the SMSA
average levels of education and experience. The coefficients on the individual variables
remain virtually unchanged from column (1), and the coefficients on the SMSA variables
have the positive signs predicted by the theory of section 2. All of the latter coefficients
are significant at the one percent level except for the coefficient on the SMSA average level
of experience in the wage equation, which is insignificant. It appears that the average level
of human capital is a productive local public good as described in section 2. It is also
important to note that the average level of education has a much greater productive
external effect than the average level of experience. While at this level of empirical
analysis I cannot investigate directly the cause of this difference, it appears to be consistent
with the inicroeconomic foundation for external effects of human capital described in the
introduction to this paper. There it was argued that the average level of human capital
influences productivity indirectly through its effect on sharing of ideas for technological
improvements. It stands to reason that the probability that a meeting between
agents/ideas in an SMSA will be "productive" is increased more by a year of SMSA
average education than by a year of SMSA average experience, since a major part of formal




It could be argued that the large coefficients on the SMSA average level of
education shown in column (2) of Tables 1 and 2 are the result of the association of average
education with other exogenous variables that increase wages and/or rents at the SMSA
level. In particular, one would expect the average level of education to be higher where
there is a high concentration of universities and university-administered federally funded
research and development centers. This in turn means that average education should be
associated with a high level of federal R & D funding per capita, an exogenous variable
that could possibly be expected to have the same local effects on productivity that I have
argued are generated by the local average level of human capital. I have therefore
aggregated to the SMSA level 1980 data supplied by the National Science Foundation
(1984) on federal R & D funding at the level of the individual university and
university-administered federally funded R & D center.10 When this variable was added to
the wage and rent equations the estimated coefficient was negative and insignificant. A
possible reason for this result is that this variable is very skewed because a few SMSAs
(especially those with federally funded It & D centers) receive very large amounts of federal
It & D dollars per capita relative to all others." I attempted to correct this problem of
skewness as follows. I created a dummy variable that equals zero if an SMSA received no
federal R & D dollars and one if it received positive federal It & D dollars. This dummy
variable and its product with the logarithm of federal It & D dollars per capita were then
included in the wage and rent equations. Again, the estimated coefficients on the new
variables were insignificant. I also experimented with a per capita, weighted sum of major
universities present in each SMSA taken from Places Rated Almanac (1981, p. 286),
'°The wage sample correlation coefficient between SMSA average education and federal R &
D expenditure per capita is 0.22.
1tFor the wage sample the measure of skewness for this variable exceeds 16. When all
observations with zero dollars are deleted the measure of skewness still exceeds 15.13
without obtaining better result8.
It is widely believed that workers in the U. S. South tend to be less educated than
workers elsewhere in the country. Indeed, in our wage sample the average level of
education for the U. S. Census region South is 12.7 years of schooling, compared to 13.2,
12.8, and 12.9 years for the West, North Central, and Northeast regions, respectively. If
there are historical or other reasons independent of average education levels that cause
Southern productivity to be lower, failing to control for the region in which workers reside
and homes are located could bias upwards the coefficient on SMSA average education in
the wage and rent equations. As seen in column (3) of Tables 1 and 2, inclusion of regional
dummies does in fact reduce the estimated coefficient on average education substantially in
both equations. As expected, residence outside the South has a positive effect on both
wages and rents.
Average education may also be correlated with omitted variables that have amenity
value. Since amenities shift down the consumer equilibrium curve in Figure 1, lowering
wages and raising rents, such a correlation would bias downwards (upwards) the estimated
coefficient on average education in the wage (rent) equation. The obvious candidate for an
SMSA-level amenity that is correlated with average education is cultural facilities. Places
Rated Almanac (1981) has compiled a "culture per capita" index based on SMSA
possessions of major universities, symphony orchestras, opera companies, dance companies,
theaters, public television, fine arts radio, museums, and public libraries (see pp. 293-294
and 320 for exact definition). I have subtracted the major universities component since I
argued above that this could have a productivity effect (though I found no evidence for it).
This corrected culture per capita index is then included as an explanatory variable in
column (4) of Tables 1 and 2. We see that in the wage equation the effects are as expected:
the coefficient on culture per capita is negative and significant at the five percent level,14
while the coefficient on average education rises from 0.034 to 0.039.12 The rent equation
results are not as expected, however, since the coefficient on the corrected culture per
capita index is negative, though insignificant.
I turn next to two site characteristics that regularly appear in the local public goods
literature and have both productivity and amenity value: climatic mildness and coastal
location. The cost-reducing and utility-enhancing effects of climatic mildness need no
explanation. Coastal location is a recreational amenity, and I have argued elsewhere
(Ranch 1991) that wages and rents should be higher in port cities due to their privileged
access to the gains from international trade. Places Rated Almanac (1981) has created a
rating for SMSA climatic mildness (see p. 4 for exact definition) based on average seasonal
temperature variation and the average annual number of heating- and cooling-degree days,
very hot and very cold months, freezing days, zero days, and 90-degree days (adjusted for
relative humidity). I let a dummy variable for coastal location equal one if an SMSA
touches an ocean or any of the Great Lakes and zero otherwise.'3 The climate rating and
the coast dummy are entered as explanatory variables in column (5) of Tables 1 and 2.
The coefficient on climate is positive and significant at the one percent level in the rent
equation and insignificant in the wage equation, indicating that its productivity and
amenity effects are of comparable importance, while the coefficient on coast is positive and
significant at the one percent level in both the wage and rent equations, indicating that its
productivity effects dominate any amenity effects. The coefficient on the SMSA average
level of education falls slightly in the wage equation while the coefficient on the SMSA
average level of experience becomes completely insignificant.'4 In the rent equation the
12The wage sample correlation coefficient between average education and the corrected
culture per capita index is 0.35.
'3Ports on the Great Lakes trade directly with Europe via the St. Lawrence Seaway.
'4Since we saw in our discussion of regional effects above that average education is highest in
the West and next to lowest in the North Central region, we might expect a positive
correlation in our wage sample between SMSA climate rating and SMSA average
education, and indeed the correlation coefficient is 0.27. On the other hand, the wage15
coefficients on both SMSA average level of human capitalvariablesfall.
In the model of section 2, SMSA population NJ does not enter the list of relevant
SMSA site characteristics s. I am thus able to solve the model sequentially by first using
equations (1) and (2) to solve for r3 and w as functions of and next using equation (4) to
substitute out for SMSA output X in equation (3), which then determines N as a function
of s and SMSA land L. However, much empirical research in urban economics starts from
the premise that city population could be a consumption disamemty (e.g., Roback (1982))
or that it could increase productivity (e.g., Henderson (1986) and the references cited
therein). In this case w, and NJ are simultaneously determined. Fortunately, equation
(3) immediately suggests using SMSA land area as an instrument for SMSA population. 15
Total land area, as opposed to the quality of a given plot of land, can reasonably be
supposed to have neither productivity value nor amenity value, and can therefore be
excluded from equations (1) and (2). It follows that in this case the wage and rent reduced
form equations are just identified, and we can estimate them by applying the method of
instrumental variables to the data after it has been subjected to the GLS transformation
described in section 3.16
SMSA population and land area in 1980 are available from the State and
Metropolitan Area Data Book, 1982, published by the Bureau of the Census. Is land area a
good instrument for population? I address this question by running a cross-SMSA
regression of population on all the SMSA-level variables in column (5) of Tables 1 and 2
plus land area. In this regression population is expressed in thousands and land area in
sample correlation coefficient between coastal location and average education is only 0.02.
If entered separately, the climate and coast variables both reduce the coefficient on average
education in the wage equation to 0.035.
lZThe model implicitly assumes that land area is given exogenously by arbitrary political
boundaries. To the extent that outlying political jurisdictions are added to an SMSA on
the basis of population, land area may to some extent be endogenous for the same reasons
as population.
l6This is the "IV-GLS analog" estimation recommended by Bowden and Turkington (1984,
Chapter 3).16
squaremiles. The estimated equation, giving t-ratios in parentheses, is:
POP =- 6879.8+ 397.5xAVGED + 73.9xAVGEXP -430.7xW+ 130.8xNC
(3.17) (2.11) (2.14) (0.86)
+ 185.6xNE + 0.O1xCULTPC + 1.38xCLIMATE + 500.1xCOAST + 0.15xLAND.
(1.04) (0.05) (2.09) (3.45) (5.40)
Thepartial correlation coefficient between SMSA population and land area implied by the
t-ratio for the latter is 0.34. We can conclude that land area is a useful but far from
perfect instrument for population.
With this information in hand, we look at the estimates reported in column (6) of
Tables 1 and 2. We see that the coefficients on population in both the wage and rent
equations are insignificant, although the signs of the coefficients support the view that
population is a consumption disamenity. In view of the quality of the instrument we have
for population one should hesitate to draw the conclusion that population is not a relevant
site characteristic. The coefficients on the SMSA-level variables that were positively
associated with population in the cross-SMSA regression all fall slightly in the wage
equation and rise slightly in the rent equation. The standard errors for the coefficients on
the variables for which that association was significant rise noticeably in both equations.
The only important result of these changes is that the coefficient on SMSA average
education in the wage equation is now only significant at the ten percent level. However,
given that the results in column (6) indicate that we have added an irrelevant variable to
both the wage and rent equations, we must conclude that the preferred model remains that
in column (5).
4.2 Sell-Selection
It is possible that the positive effects of SMSA average education in the wage
equations of Table 1 reflect its association with higher unobserved ability of workers rather
than higher productivity of a given worker. This could happen because higher average
education in an SMSA is positively correlated with the return to unobserved ability or17
skill, causing higher quality workers to migrate to SMSAs with higher average education
levels. A formal model of this spatial selection or sorting process is set out by Borjas,
Bronars, and Trejo in their paper, "Self-Selection and Internal Migration in the United
States" (1992). They apply the Roy (1951) model of occupational choice to selection
between regions of residence. Their model can be expressed using the notation of equation
(7) above if we impose more structure on the error termSpecifically, it is supposed
that the log wage of individual i in region (SMSA) jisgiven by
(7')
where indexes an individual's unobserved ability or skills and is a continuous random
variable with mean zero and a range defined over the real number line. The parameter
can then be interpreted as the "rate of return" to ability in SMSA j.Otherthings equal, it
is clear that an individual with a high (low) realization of b will want to live and work in
an SMSA with a high (low) i.Infact, Borjas et al. are able to show that
E(bI choose j)> E(&Ichoosek) if and only if ,>,.
Wecan complete the formalization of the selection argument by supposing that ,is
positively correlated with the average level of formal schooling in an SMSA, in which case
this average will have a positive coefficient in the log wage equation that reflects selection
bias.
Iwill investigate the selection argument by examining both what it implies and
what is does notimply.Taking the second approach first, one can note a key difference
between the model just outlined and the model of section 2: the latter is a general
equilibrium model that determines SMSA rents as well as wages, while the former is a
partial equilibrium model that determines SMSA wage levels only. More specifically, in
the model of section 2 rents and wages adjust so as to make all individuals indifferent
concerning in which SMSA they live and work. If the model of section 2 is correct that
SMSA average education is a site characteristic that increases productivity but has no
amenity value, then ceteris paribus an additional year of SMSA average education should18
raise rents so as to just offset the benefit to consumers from its positive effect on wages. In
short, changes in SMSA average education should shift the firm equilibrium curve in Figure
1 along an unchanged consumer equilibrium curve. On the other hand, the Roy model of
spatial selection makes nopredictionsconcerning inter-SMSA rent differentials. Thus the
apparent effect of SMSA average education on wages, which according to this model is due
to selection bias, should have no particular relationship to any effect of SMSA average
education on rents. A finding of the relationship predicted by the model of section 2 would
therefore be a remarkable coincidence.
The consumer equilibrium curve is defined by equation (1) in section 2. By
logarithmically differentiating this equation and using Roy's identity, we can show that
movement along the consumer equilibrium curve implies
-r(thj+ (dw/dh)/w=0, (8)
whereis the share of consumers' (labor) income spent on rent. Note that (dr/dx)/r and
(dw/dx)/w are given by the coefficients on independent variable x in the rent and wage
equations, since log(r) and log(w) are the dependent variables. We should be able to
accept the hypothesis that =0when we substitute into equation (8) the coefficients on
SMSA average education reported in column (5) of Tables 1 and 2 and the sample value
=0.30.We have -(0.30)(0.112)+ (0.033) =- 0.0006with a standard error of 0.0 13,
ignoring any error in the estimate ofThus the relationship between the wage and rent
effects of SMSA average education is as predicted by the model of section 2, which I
interpret as evidence favoring the productivity interpretation of the wage effect over the
selection bias interpretation.
One can also attempt to directly address the implication of the selection model that
SMSA average education is positively correlated with the SMSA return to ability i.
FollowingBorjas et al., we note from (7') that is proportional to the extent of earnings
inequality, so that one can use wage dispersion within each region to measure returns to19
ability.'1 They compute two measures of wage dispersion, whose construction I imitate
exactly. The first is the standard deviation of the log hourly wage, which they call the
"unstandardized" dispersion in wages. The alternative "standardized" measure of
dispersion is the root mean square error from SMSA-speciflc log wage regressions. The
unstandardized measure of wage dispersion ranges from 0.54 to 1.11, with a mean of 0.77
and a standard deviation of 0.10, while the standardized measure ranges from 0.28 to 1.04
with a mean of 0.65 and a standard deviation of 0.11. The two measures are highly
correlated across SMSAs, with a correlation coefficient of 0.88 that is similar to the
correlation coefficient of 0.90 that Borjas et al. found across states. I also computed a third
measure of wage dispersion that is more directly based on the model (7'), which is the
standard deviation by SMSA of the residuals from the least squares dummy variable
(LSDV) equation in column (1) of Table 1.18 The descriptive statistics for this LSDV
measure are very similar to those for the standardized measure. If SMSA average
education is positively correlated with returns to ability, as the selection argument
requires, then it should be positively correlated with one or more of these measures of wage
dispersion. However, the correlation coefficients of SMSA average education with the
unstandardized, standardized, and LSDV measures of wage dispersion are, respectively,
0.03, 0.01, and -0.01, none of which is significantly different from zero at even the ten
percent level.
5. Condusions
I began this paper by noting the widespread belief in the existence of positive
'If the spatial sorting generated by the model (7') is sufficiently strong, the differences
between wage dispersions across regions cx ante will be greatly attenuated ex post.
However, the descriptive statistics reported show substantial variation across SMSAs in the
measures of wage dispersion that I use.
'8The model (7') suggests that the error termi.might be groupwise heteroskedastic. No
significant changes in the wage and rent equations reported in Tables 1 and 2 occur if we
adjust the GLS transformation to allow for this.20
externalitiesfrom formal education. The evidence presented in sections 3 and 4 supports
the existence of these externalities. I am now in the position to answer the question of how
largeisthe effect of an additional year of average education on total factor productivity.
Using the coefficients on the average level of human capital variables reported in Tables 1
and 2, 1 can compute an estimate of the percentage cost reduction (total factor
productivity increase) that would result from an additional year of average education,
taking the conservative view that this implies an offsetting one year reduction in average
experience. By logarithmically differentiating equation (2), we obtain:
[(8c/&)/c](dr/d.) + [(&/Ow)/c](dw/dh) =- (ôc/ô)/c,or
Or(dI/dh)/r + 9(dw/dh)/w =- (ôc/)/c, (9)
where and °w are the land and labor shares in the value of output, respectively. I follow
Beeson and Eberts (1989, P. 448), who use national accounts data to compute the figures
0.064 and 0.73 forand 0 Substituting into equation (9) these figures and the
coefficients on average education and average experience reported in column (5) of Tables 1
and 2, we have (0.064)(0.112)+(0.73)(0.033) =0.031for the effect of the SMSA average
level of education and (0.064)(0.013) + (0.73)(0.003) =0.003for the effect of the SMSA
average level of experience, yielding a net effect of an additional year of average education
equal to 0.028. The standard error of the net effect is 0.008, ignoring any errors in the
estimates ofand My best estimate on the basis of the evidence presented in this
paper is therefore that each additional year of SMSA average education can be expected to
raise total factor productivity by 2.8 percent, with a standard error of estimate of 0.8
percent.
Is this estimate reasonable? The only other attempt to quantify the productivity
effect of the average level of human capital of which I am aware is in Lucas (1988). He
builds a theoretical model of long-run growth where the "engine of growth" is
accumulation of human capital, and the average level of human capital raised to a power
enters the aggregate production function. Lucas "estimates" that exponent using U. S.21
data under the assumption that the United States was on the balanced growth path
described by his model during the period 1909-1957. (He notes that one could fit this data
equally well using a model in which there is no human capital externality.) The result is
0.417, which is basically driven by the difference between the rates of growth of physical
and human capital per capita estimated by Denison (1961). This exponent implies that an
additional year of average education increases U. S. total factor productivity by 3.2
percent.19 My estimate of 2.8 percent therefore seems very reasonable in light of the only
other comparable figure available. While one would obviously not want to make too much
of the closeness of the two numbers, it is nevertheless encouraging to see this degree of
agreement between cross-sectional and time series findings.
In section 3 I argued that the difference found between the effects of the SMSA
average levels of education and experience supports the hypothesis that my results reflect
productivity benefits from geographic concentration of human capital caused by sharing of
ideas. Yet I would hesitate to claim that this study has enabled us to "see" sharing of
ideas at work: this may require empirical analysis at a still further disaggregated level
than the city. Rather it is hoped that this study will serve both as a springboard for more
detailed research and as a stimulus to attempts at replication, perhaps using data from
countries other than the United States.
l9There is no experience component of human capital in Lucas's model or in the estimate of
the rate of growth of human capital per capita that he uses, so the average level of human
capital identically equals the average level of education. The Cobb-Douglas formulation
implies a constant elasticity of total factor productivity with respect to average education,
which I use in combination with the mean of 12.86 years reported in Table 1 to obtain the
effect of a one year increase in average education.22
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 Notes to Tables 1-2
Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Significance levels are given only for the variables below the broken line:
asignificantly different from zero at the one percent level.
different from zero at the five percent level.
C5jgpjfiCaflt1y different from zero at the ten percent level.